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Genetic Confidentiality:
What's the Big Secret?
PAUL A. LOMBARDO t
I. Introduction
The explosion of information generated by the Human Genome Project
and related advances in molecular biology come at a propitious time. Never
before have Americans been so sensitive to their rights-real and imagined-in
the realm of privacy, nor so aware of the potential for abuse of private
information. As information that describes some of the most personal features
of an individual's identity becomes available via genetic analysis-information
linked to conditions that have been characterized as "immutable, heritable
traits that intrinsically implicate the bearer's identity"'-the chorus of support
for legislation to prohibit genetic discrimination grows louder Demands for
restriction on the use of information derived from DNA testing have increased,
and legal remedies are proposed to avoid the danger of creating a "genetic
underclass," particularly vulnerable to the whimsy of health care insurance
markets.
Yet in focusing on this newest kind of medical information, we often fail
to realize that the potential misuse of genetic information is only another
example of how other types of health-related information may be misused. We
overlook the state of the law ostensibly written to protect medical information.
Such law varies widely from state to state and contains numerous exceptions.
We know relatively little about how effectively or how poorly that law
protects the more prosaic brands of medical information-such as diagnostic
history or family background reports-which themselves may provide ample
basis upon which to found discriminatory decisions, particularly in regard to
insurance coverage.
tPaul A. Lombardo, Ph.D., J.D., is an Associate Professor and Director of the Center for
Mental Health Law Training and Research at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry & Public
Policy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
1. Eric T. Juengst, Priorities in Professional Ethics and Social Policy for Human
Genetics, 266 J Am Med Ass 1835, 1836 (1991).
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Straining to establish a new air-tight standard for uses of genetic data, we
overlook the data readily available from blood and tissue samples regularly
provided by medical patients, employees, candidates for insurance or the mil-
lions of people who flow through the military or our systems of criminal
adjudication. Nor do we have a thorough understanding of the numerous well
established and legally sanctioned means to conduct DNA testing that already
are in place. Before we push through specialized laws to protect genetic
confidentiality we should also be asking: how easy is it to collect or access ge-
netic information? And do we have an adequate understanding of existing legal
provisions that purport to protect genetic privacy?
It is also worth asking whether too much is being made, in the academic
as well as the popular literature, of the dangers inherent in the widespread
availability of genetic information, and whether too little is made of the danger
to individual privacy that exists in the face of a generally porous medical
information system in which the traditional norm of confidentiality has all but
deteriorated.
This article is meant to provide some perspective on the recent attention
to genetic privacy law. It includes a survey of current practices for collecting
genetic data, and a compilation of existing state laws that attempt to regulate
the use of genetic information to prevent insurance discrimination.
State insurance law is permeated with contradictory statutes that often fail
to make the necessary distinctions between health, disability and life insurance.
A hypothetical case is presented to demonstrate the shortcomings in those state
laws, and to explain the use of arguments for genetic confidentiality as proxy
arguments for the need for health care reform. I argue that however well
intentioned our attention to genetic confidentiality is, it will not cure the
health care access crisis.
Finally, I wish to call attention to the "genephobic" rhetoric that is
imbedded in several recent proposals for an overhaul of genetic privacy. The
reductionism of some of the language being used by prominent commentators
threatens to push public understanding of genetic conditions further toward an
embrace of genetic determinism-to the detriment of those very people whose
interests new law is meant to protect. The rhetoric of fear surrounding the im-
pending revolution in genetic information may have the unintended conse-
quence of further stigmatizing precisely those people whose genetic conditions
mark them as vulnerable to discriminatory treatment.
II. Why an Examination of Genetic Confidentiality is Timely
Several developments have combined to raise new issues about the claims
potential patients and others may have on the developing genetic database. On
the scientific front, the Human Genome Project has fueled an expansion of the
technology to analyze genetic material. The Project is a systematic attempt to
locate, map and sequence the totality of human DNA, thus "defin[ing] all the
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genes that make up a human being." 2 The Project has already lead to the
isolation of 4,000 single gene diseases, and the location of numerous genetic
conditions.3 Theoretically, every sample of human blood or tissue can be
tested for these conditions. Though economic means for broad scale testing are
not yet widely available, no one disputes the likelihood that such tests will
appear and be used in the foreseeable future. The tests will yield a bounty of
information about current medical conditions, risk factors for numerous other
inchoate conditions,4 and perhaps-though much less certainly-even portions
of a behavioral profile.'
The potential for an ever-expanding genetic database emerges in coinci-
dence with high public expectations of rights to privacy. The widespread
confidence in the right to privacy is well placed. Federal statutes and numerous
court decisions have guaranteed protection for information as seemingly
commonplace and unthreatening as a Social Security number.6 Governments
must surmount such barriers before using personal identifiers even for tradi-
tionally favored activities such as compiling lists of voters.7
Additionally, a new jurisprudence of privacy has developed as a result of
the reproductive rights decisions, most notably Griswold v Connecticut' and
Roe v Wade.9 This "constitutionalization" of medical privacy as part of the
First Amendment is one source of public expectations. The suggestion that
2. Walter Gilbert, A Vision of the Grail in Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood, eds,
The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project 83
(Harvard 1992).
3. See Ronald G. Crystal, Transfer of Genes to Humans: Early Lessons and Obstacles
to Success, 270 Science 404 (1995).
4. A number of DNA-based tests have been developed that will allow specific gene
mutations to be identified in individuals. Positive test results will signal the heightened
probability that a genetic disorder will manifest itself in an individual at some point in
life. See Victor A. McKusick, Genomic Mapping and How It Has Progressed, 26 Hospital
Practice 74, 89 (Oct 1991). Current research suggests that tests for adult onset diseases
such as cancer, diabetes or Alzheimer disease may become widely available over the next
ten years. Id at 89-90. See also Mary E. D'Alton and Alan H. DeCherney, Prenatal
Diagnosis, 328 New Engl J Med 114, 118 (1993) ("The mapping of the human genome
is expected to be completed in the next 10 to 15 years, and, as a result, molecular genetic
techniques are likely to be available for the detection of all common monogenic dis-
orders.").
5. The controversy over the use of genetic information to predict behavior continues.
See Tabitha M. Powledge, Genetics and the Control of Crime, 46 BioScience 7 (Jan 1996).
6. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-579, 88 Stat 1897 (1974), codified at 5 USC
S 552A (1994). See also Greidinger v Davis, 988 F2d 1344, 1353 (4th Cir 1993) ("At
the time of its enactment, Congress recognized the dangers of widespread use of SSN's as
universal identifiers .... [A Senate Report stated that SSN use is] 'one of the most
serious manifestations of privacy concerns in the Nation.' . . . Since the passage of the
Privacy Act, an individual's concern over his SSN's confidentiality and misuse has become
significantly more compelling.").
7. Greidinger, 988 F2d at 1344 (cited in note 6).
8. 381 US 479 (1965).
9. 410 US 113 (1973).
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refusal of medical treatment even in the face of death is founded on a similar
extension of the right has been embraced by many state courts and was
suggested by the United States Supreme Court."° There seems to be no limit
to the degree to which the "medical privacy" standard can be stretched-from
abortion (Roe) to refusal of treatment (Cruzan) to assisted suicide (Compassion
in Dying).
In the years since Roe, we have experienced a growing awareness of the
many ways that information collected in the confidential health care setting
can be stored and transmitted electronically." That awareness has been
accompanied by heightened concern that personal information stored in large
databases can be recorded in error, replicated through disclosure and misused
negligently or even with malice. One of the most troubling features of techno-
logical innovation is the ability of complete strangers to assemble personal
information from a variety of sources surreptitiously, or at least without the
knowledge of the person whom it purportedly describes.
Preceding concerns with possible abuses of information is the understand-
ing that new informational technologies make the distribution of information
to ever larger circles of recipients likely if not inevitable. In the current medical
context, for example, the Institute of Medicine has estimated that "the number
of authorized users of the computer-based patient record is too exhaustive to
list, and would parallel the complete list of the individuals and organizations
associated directly or indirectly with health care." 2 The combination of more
personalized medical data-such as that generated by genetic testing-with the
ability to manipulate that data electronically only heightens the fears of those
who see technology encroaching on hard won rights to privacy.
Specific permutations of the law of medical confidentiality occurring in
response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic have also had a significant impact on the
way we now look at genetic information. Soon after the development of a test
for the HIV antibody in 1985, states began to adopt specific statutory
protections for the results of HIV testing 3 and within a short interval, the
concept of special treatment for AIDS-related medical information was en-
dorsed by a federal commission. The presidential AIDS commission argued for
federal legislation that would protect from disclosure identifying information
obtained via HIV testing or counseling except under carefully circumscribed
circumstances and with the written consent of the patient. 4 The AIDS com-
10. See Cruzan v Director, Mo Dept of Health, 497 US 261 (1990). See also Com-
passion in Dying v State of Washington, 49 F3d 586 (9th Cir 1996) (en banc).
11. See, generally, Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv L Rev 737 (1989);
Arthur R. Miller, The Right of Privacy-A Look Through the Kaleidoscope, 46 SMU L
Rev 37 (1992); and Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the
New Technological Age, 12 Hofstra L Rev 893 (1984).
12. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 Cornell L Rev 451, 485
(1995). See also, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Tests and
Health Insurance: Results of a Survey--Background Paper, OTA-BP-BA-98 (Oct 1992).
13. See, for example, Cal Health and Safety Code S120980 (West 1996).
14. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
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mission echoed concerns already lodged in state legislatures, where a standard
of zero tolerance for breach of confidentiality had emerged.'
While the need for unique rules to protect the confidentiality of those who
contracted HIV infection in the early years of the AIDS epidemic was obvious,
the standard of confidentiality for HIV may not be appropriate for all genetic
information. Yet the tenor of much recent scholarship on genetic confidentiali-
ty has partaken of the rhetoric characteristic of the mid-1980s, when
HIV/AIDS discrimination was a paramount concern of the health law commu-
nity. Though some genetic information may give rise to stereotypically phobic
reactions analogous to the initial public response to AIDS (for example, genetic
links to certain mental illnesses could provide the basis for serious social stig-
ma), the vast majority of medical conditions thus far connected to specific
genetic markers do not elicit the stigma, fear, or discomfort evoked by an
inevitably deadly disease linked to socially marginal populations.
III. The Demise of Medical Confidentiality
While the technology, law, and public perception of privacy were changing,
a tradition of medical confidentiality was deteriorating. In contrast to the
broader rubric of privacy, the requirement of confidentiality is founded in the
relationship of trust between doctor and patient. Hippocrates' ancient pre-
scription for confidentiality in the medical setting describes a universal ethical
requirement for those who work in health care settings.16 The vulnerability of
the patient in the therapeutic encounter-yielding access to one's secrets no
less than to one's body-demands a reciprocal promise of protection by the
physician that intimate information will not be used to the patient's detri-
ment.
It has become clear that this expectation of patients is not always warrant-
ed. In an often-quoted 1982 article in the New England Journal of Medicine,
University of Chicago physician and bioethicist Marc Siegler declared that
confidentiality in the medical setting was no longer a viable concept. Describ-
ing contemporary practice, with numerous caregivers easily in reach of presum-
ably secret patient information, Siegler declared:
Medical confidentiality, as it has traditionally been understood by pa-
tients and doctors, no longer exists. This ancient medical principle, which
has been included in every physician's oath and code of ethics since
Hippocratic times, has become old, worn-out and useless; it is a decrepit
concept.'7
Epidemic 127 (1988).
15. See, for example, Estate of Bebringer v Medical Center at Princeton, 249 NJ Super
597, 592 A2d 1251 (1991).
16. Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation, in
Henry E. Sigerist, ed, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 1, 63 (Johns Hopkins Supp
1943).
17. Mark Siegler, Confidentiality in Medicine-A Decrepit Concept, 307 New Eng J of
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Siegler's lament focused on developing trends in the practice of medicine that
give too many people access to patient data, and simultaneous erosion of an
ethic of practice that recognized shared secrets as part of the foundation of
trust characteristic of the doctor-patient relationship.
Since the appearance of Siegler's article, new technologies that require
computerized medical records and convenient electronic data transmission have
made the protection of clinical secrets even more difficult. Some commentators
have asserted the irrelevance of the traditional rule: "The rule of confidentiality
does not work nearly so well in a modern information society.... Focusing
legal protection on a single therapeutic relationship within this information
environment is an anachronistic vestige of an earlier and simpler time in medi-
cine. " " These pessimistic comments about the viability of the very notion of
medical confidentiality sound ironic alongside current public assertions of a
right to informational privacy and anxiety about its potential loss.
How does the existence of a patient's genetic identity as a part of the
medical record fit into this tradition of confidentiality? Physicians also perceive
as novel the risks to medical privacy that the new genetics exacerbates. As one
commentator has noted: "Physicians engaged in family practice must also be
aware that the likely proliferation of genetic information about their patients
has significant potential to harm patients' ability to obtain insurance, includ-
ing health, life, and disability income coverage."19 It would appear that the
inclusion of genetic data within the medical record will be just one more kind
of information no longer protected by the once personal promise of confi-
dentiality. Since the costs of genetic services-testing, analysis, interpretation
and counseling-will inevitably be paid in most circumstances by health
insurance, try though they may, family physicians will not be able to prevent
personal genetic data from becoming another part of the electronic data base.
What other reasons do we have to fear genetic information?
IV. Sources of Concern
A. THE INTIMATE NATURE OF GENETIC DATA
The tone of alarm surrounding recent discussions of data yielded by the new
genetic technologies echoes with an ominous ring. The rhetoric suggests that
revealing one's genetic secrets, for example, the potential for future disease, will
lead inevitably to discrimination or other distressing results. Similarly, genetic
screening has been described as a process which "provides an ineradicable
marker of deviance with potentially lifelong social consequences to the affected
individual."2" A diagnosis of disease condition with a genetic component has
Med 1518 (1982).
18. Gostin, 80 Cornell Law Rev at 512 (cited in note 12).
19. S. Van McCrary, et al, Ethical and Practical Implications of the Human Genome
Initiative for Family Medicine, 2 Archives of Family Medicine 1158, 1160 (Nov 1993).
20. Note, Insurers and Genetic Testing: Shopping for the Perfect Pair of Genes, 40
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been characterized as if it created a biological "scarlet letter,"2 marking the
bearer as an easy target for discrimination, stigma and scorn. More generally,
commentators have noted that "the systematic collection of genomic information
holds the potential for grave personal and social detriment. " '
Nor is the fear of genetic victimization limited to America. Similar concerns
have been voiced in Great Britain, among other countries:
So great is the degree of consensus among the medical genetics establish-
ment [about the dangers of genetic discrimination] that the government has
already acquiesced to the central recommendation of the [House of Com-
mons Science and Technology Committee] report-the establishment of a
regulatory body for medical genetics.... the committee (in its recent report
"Human Genetics: The Science and its Consequences") called for a law
guaranteeing genetic privacy, with criminal penalties for anyone misusing
genetic information.'
But genetic data may signal many conditions, most of which are not necessarily
stigmatizing nor even particularly intimate. At least part of our fear of misuse of
genetic information comes not from the nature of the data itself, but our history
of abusing some people on the basis of their supposed hereditary propensity.
B. AMERICA'S EUGENIC HISTORY
One source of the anxiety is America's legacy of eugenics. For most of this
century, the suggestion of biologically verifiable genetic inferiority was used as
the basis for sexual sterilization of thousands of residents of state institutions, 24
laws to prohibit interracial marriage,' and immigration quotas for some ethnic
groups.
26
Europeans, who experienced the horrors of the Holocaust first band, are also
sensitive to suggestions that increased genetic knowledge might clear the path for
repressive legislation based on theories of genetic determinism. Recent scholar-
ship has clarified how important such theories were to the development of the
Drake L Rev 121, 141 (1991) (quoting Marc Lapp6, The Limits of Genetic Inquiry, 17
Hastings Center Report 5 (1987)).
21. Elaine Draper, Genetic Secrets: Social Issues of Medical Screening in a Genetic Age,
22 Hastings Center Report 515 (1992).
22. Gostin, 80 Cornell L Rev at 492 (cited in note 12).
23. David King, The State of Eugenics, 8 New Statesman 25 (1995).
24. See John Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 BU L Rev
421 (1996).
25. Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics and Racism: Historical Footnotes to
Loving v. Virginia, 21 UC Davis L Rev 421 (1988).
26. William H. Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research 60 (Illinois 1994).
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Nazi ideology,27 and there is understandable sensitivity to the possibility that
science could again be perverted for totalitarian ends.
The implication that biological traits and behavioral characteristics are
lodged in the DNA as quantifiable determinants of a person's future is a staple
of popular thought as well. That genetic information is available indirectly
through psychological tests, which can be usefully employed to diagnose mem-
bers of a biological "underclass" 2 is an assertion of books like The Bell
Curve.29 The suggestion that mental illness or crime may be genetically coded
intrigues scientists and politicians alike, all the while continuing to engender
strong protest as it did at a recent conference probing theories that rely on
biological explanations of crime and violence." The use of DNA data as a
pretext for discrimination of all kinds is a common consideration among those
who analyze the social implications of the "new genetics" yielded by the Human
Genome Project.3
The more recent history of genetic discrimination is exemplified by the XYY
controversy, where a chromosomal abnormality formed a basis for designating
certain men "congenital criminals" whose "supermale" genetic identity suppos-
edly marked them as prone to crime, and screening programs to deter criminality
were proposed. 2 Discovery of the gene for sickle-cell anemia led to a similar
debacle, with carriers of the sickling trait being forced to leave the Air-Force
Academy on the grounds that they were at risk for high altitude attacks, and
grounding of airline pilots by many major airlines because they tested positive as
carriers of the sickle-cell trait.33 Others who carried the sickling trait were
encouraged to undergo sterilization operations to avoid nonexistent dangers of
27. See generally Sheila Faith Weiss, Race Hygiene and National Efficiency: The Eugen-
ics of Wilhelm Schallmayer (California 1987); Stefan Kiihl, The Nazi Connection: Eugenics,
American Racism, and German National Socialism (Oxford 1994); Gotz Aly, Peter Chroust
and Christian Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Johns
Hopkins 1994).
28. Dorothy Nelkin and Lawrence Tancredi, Dangerous Diagnostics: The Social Power
of Biological Information 176 (Basic Books 1989).
29. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class
Structure in American Life 22-23 (Free Press 1994).
30. Wade Roush, Conflict Marks Crime Conference, Science 1808 (Sept 29, 1995);
Natalie Angier, At Conference on Links of Violence to Heredity, A Calm after the Storm,
NY Times C8 (September 26, 1995).
31. See, for example, Hille Haker, et al, eds, Ethics of Human Genome Analysis: Eu-
ropean Perspectives (Attempto-Verlag 1993); Tom Wilke, Perilous Knowledge: the Human
Genome Project and Its Implications (California 1989); Timothy F. Murphy and Marc A.
Lapp6, eds, Justice and the Human Genome Project (California 1994).
32. David Suzuki and Peter Knudtson, Genethics: the Clash Between the New Genetics
and Human Values 149-52 (Harvard 1989).
33. Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics 26 (Routledge 1990).
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childbirth? 4 Only later was it clarified that neither XYY nor sickle-cell trait
provided any rational grounds for differential treatment."5
Eugenics, biological determinism and the all too recent examples of invidious
discrimination justified on purportedly scientific grounds all cast a dark shadow
over the prospect of new techniques that promise (or threaten) to make compre-
hensive genetic diagnoses available.
Lawmakers are sensitive to public concern over the potential for misuses of
medical information. On the general medical front, a federal law to regulate
medical confidentiality has been introduced in Congress. 6 The need for regula-
tion of previously unknowable genetic information has led to a proposed model
genetic privacy law." Fears of misuse of genetic information by parents has
even yielded arguments in favor of separate privacy protection for unborn fetus-
es. 3 Although there is high level of attention for potential abuses, and ongoing
calls for new legislation, relatively little has been written about the variety of
ways that genetic data are made available today, or how easy it is to obtain a
sample upon which to perform a genetic test.
V. Collection of Genetic Data: Current Practices
The following list catalogues a number of the ways that genetic data is
already collected, created, and stored.
A. DNA DATA BANKS-CRIMINAL CONTEXTS
Approximately half of the states have DNA banks created to allow identifi-
cation of repeat criminal offenders.3 9 Some use blood, others saliva samples, so
the level of physical intrusion necessary to establish the banks is different. Some
states bank DNA evidence for violent offenses or sexual offenses; others such
as North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia and West Virginia bank DNA for many
nonviolent offenses.4 ' Congress has also authorized and fostered the develop-
34. See Avery v County of Burke, 660 F2d 111 (4th Cir 1981).
35. Suzuki and Knudtson, Genetbics at 162-63 (cited in note 32).
36. Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995, 141 Cong Rec S 15575-01, S 15576
(1995).
37. George J. Annas, et al, The Genetic Privacy Act and commentary (BU 1995). This
document is available on the World Wide Web at http-/www-bushp.bu.edu/Depts/
HealthLaw/.
38. Jeffrey R. Botkin, Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, 25 Hastings Center Report 32,
35 (1995) ("A belief in genetic determinism by parents may severely limit the child's
ability to find and chart his or her own course in life .... In short, it is appropriate to
consider some information about the fetus as private and confidential.").
39. See generally Note, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law Enforcement
or Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 Am J Crim L 461 (1995).
40. See, for example, NC Gen Stat S 1SA-266.4 (Michie Supp 1994); Wash Rev Code
Ann S 43.43.754 (West Supp 1995); Fla Stat Ann S 943.325 (West Supp 1995); Mo Ann
Stat S 650.050 (Vernon Supp 1994).
41. See NC Gen Star S 15a-266.4, ORS 137.076, ORS 161.325, Va Code 5 19.2-
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ment of DNA data banks42 and the FBI is involved in a national effort to collect
DNA for purposes of law enforcement investigation.43
While the mere existence of these data banks raise significant questions for
privacy advocates focused on criminal law issues," at least one federal court of
appeals has endorsed the involuntary blood sampling required of prisoners under
state law.4" The Schmerber principle,46 allowing involuntary bloodletting for
criminal justice motives, seems elastic enough to cover blood used for DNA
identification and analysis.47
The privacy of data bank information collected by the FBI is protected by
criminal penalties.48 Some states have similar protections,49 but most do not
have laws that apply uniquely to DNA and are designed to prevent inappropriate
diversions of samples banked for official use."0
B. PATERNITY TESTING
Almost half of the states recognize the use of genetic test results in parentage
contests, and some have argued that DNA testing should be the gold standard
for deciding paternity issues. The laboratory tests are now widely available."1
310.2, West Va Code Ann S 15-2-24a.
42. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2069 (1994), codi-
fied at 42 USCA 514132 (Supp V 1995).
43. Id.
44. See E. Donald Shapiro & Michelle L. Weinberg, DNA Data Banking: The
Dangerous Erosion of Privacy, 38 Cleve St L Rev 455 (1990); J. Clay Smith, The
Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U Pitt L Rev 865 (1994).
45. Jones v Murray, 962 F2d 302 (4th Cir 1992).
46. Scbmerber v California, 384 US 757, 771 (1966) ("Extraction of blood samples for
testing is . . .common place in these days of periodic physical examinations and experi-
ence with [these tests] teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that
for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain.").
Not to be forgotten, however, are the arguments of the dissenters in that case,
concerning the intrusiveness of "bloodletting." Id at 779 (Douglas, dissenting) ("No clearer
invasion of this right of privacy can be imagined than forcible bloodletting of the kind
involved here"); and Id at 779 (Fortas, dissenting) ("the State has no right to commit any
kind of violence upon the person, or to utilize the results of such a tort, and the ex-
traction of blood, over protest, is an act of violence.").
47. See E. Donald Shapiro, et al, The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Pa-
ternity Action, 7 J L & Health 1, 2 (1992-93) ("It is well settled law that a court may
constitutionally order blood tests. . . . By extension, there is no reason to doubt the
constitutionality of a court-ordered blood or tissue test for DNA profiling, as long as it
is not invasive.").
48. 42 USCA S 14133(c) (Supp V 1995) (fines up to $100,000 may be levied for
unlawful disclosure of identifiable DNA information or possession of DNA samples).
49. See, for example, Va Code Ann S 19.2-310.6 (Michie Supp 1995) (prohibiting
unauthorized uses of DNA data bank and creating a felony for possession of forensic
samples).
50. See Note, 22 Am J Crim L at 485-486 (cited in note 40).
51. Shapiro, 7 J L & Health at 2 ("Courts may now order the child, the biological
mother and the putative father, as well as other relevant parties such as the child's
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DNA testing is allowed or mandated by portions of federal law that condi-
tion receipt of funding on procedures to improve the effectiveness of child
support enforcement. 2
C. ADOPTION
Several states allow adoption agencies to condition placement on medical
testing of potential parents. The suggestion that disclosure of the genetic heritage
of "birth parents" may be within the standard of care for adoption agencies has
been made in cases where congenital illness of an adopted child was discov-
ered. 3 Some commentators have argued for expanded authority of adoption
agencies to perform genetic tests and make disclosures to adopted children and
their adoptive parents. 4 They argue that the law should move toward more
complete disclosure, for the benefit of new parents and adopted children."s
D. GENETIC REGISTRIES FOR DISEASES OF NEWBORNS
Research and data collection on a number of inherited diseases has been
encouraged by federal funding since the passage of the National Sickle Cell
Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs and Genetic Diseases Act of 1976.6
siblings or grandparents, to submit to both traditional and DNA paternity tests. By
extracting a small quantity of blood or tissue from the child, the mother and the putative
father under highly controlled testing conditions and then subjecting the sample to DNA
profiling, it is now possible to scientifically determine the probability of paternity almost
to a near certainty which should more than fulfill both substantive and procedural legal
requirements.") (cited in note 48).
52. See 42 USCA 5666 (West Pamphlet 4A Nov 1996) (requiring statutorily prescribed
procedures to improve the effectiveness of child support enforcement). Section 666
provides:
(a) Types of procedures required
In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A) of this title, each State must have in
effect laws requiting the use of the following procedures, . . . to increase the
effectiveness of the program which the State administers under this part;
(5)(B)(i) Procedures under which the State is required, in a contested
paternity case (unless otherwise barred by State law)to require the child and all
other parties ... to submit to genetic tests upon the request of any such par-
ty . ...
42 USCA S 666(a)(5)(B)(i). See generally Shapiro, 7 J L & Health at 4 n14 (correspond-
ing state enactments) (cited in note 48).
53. See, for example, M H v Caritas Family Services, 488 NW2d 282, 288 (Minn
1994).
54. See, for example, D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A
Blueprint for Legislative Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Information in
Adoption, 70 NC L Rev 681 (1992).
55. Id at 687 ("Fewer than half of the states adequately address the need to collect,
retain, and transmit to concerned parties medical and genetic information acquired
subsequent to the adoption.").




Almost all states have laws that mandate screening of newborns for specific
diseases,57 and a number of them also protect the information collected with
specific provisions for confidentiality of the information, as well as the more
general protections that are included in medical confidentiality statutes of the
majority of the states.5 8
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-DNA DOG TAGS
Since 1991, every member of the Armed Forces has been subject to DNA
banking via blood and tissue samples. According to the Department of Defense,
such samples are collected solely for the purpose of identifying the bodies of
people who have died in service. Two Marines who challenged the DNA banking
procedures were recently subjected to special court martial, but received no
punishment. Their subsequent lawsuit, attempting to have the practice declared
unconstitutional, was dismissed by a federal district court.5 9 Their appeal is
pending as of this writing in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
F. OTHER SOURCES FOR DNA ANALYSIS
In addition to samples of DNA that may have been analyzed for the uses
listed above, ready sources of blood or tissue are available from many sources.
Many medical procedures require blood or tissue for diagnostic or research pur-
poses, and there is no consistent regulation of the use of stored samples in the
medical context. For example, the Red Cross or other blood banking organiza-
tions store massive quantities of blood donated by a wide segment of the popu-
lation. Life and disability insurance companies routinely collect blood samples
and administer medical examinations prior to issuing coverage. Large employers
also commonly employ medical personnel to assist in an employee health plan or
workers compensation program, and even in the post-ADA (Americans with
Disabilities Act) era, physical examinations involving blood sampling are not
unusual.
All of these stored samples of blood or tissue are available as potential
repositories of DNA to be used for individual diagnosis or identification purpos-
es. What law, if any, protects against disclosure of their contents, and how
effectively is it enforced? One example of a federal statute meant to protect
intimate information on health conditions provides an instructive example. For
more than twenty years, the identity and records of anyone in a federally assisted
program of drug treatment have been protected from disclosure and use, even in
the context of law enforcement investigation, by a federal law that provides
57. See Lori B. Andrews, State Laws and Regulations Governing Newborn Screening
1 (Am Bar Found 1985).
58. Lori B. Andrews, Overview of Legal Issues, 83 Pediatrics 886, 889 (Supp 1989).
59. Mayfield v Dalton 901 FSupp 300 (D Hawaii 1995). A third serviceman refused
to give a blood sample and faced charges in military court. See Gary Borg, New DNA
Court Martial, Chi Trib (May 9, 1996).
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criminal penalties for breach of confidentiality.60 Yet in the face of thousands
of violations and a general ignorance of the law by many whose work it affects,
no prosecutions of violators have been reported in the history of the now
twenty-year-old Drug Abuse Confidentiality Law. A review of the Specialty Law
Digest (Health) from 1975-1995 revealed no reported cases, nor are any cases
available in the Federal Supplement, the likely reporter for trial results concern-
ing this federal statute.
For people who have provided no sample, how easy is it to obtain an
adequate amount of blood or tissue to perform DNA analysis? Given the current
technology, there is no need for intrusiveness in the collection of DNA. Blood is
clearly adequate, but for the blood-averse, a salt-water wash of saliva contains
enough epithelial cells to do the job, as do hair clippings, or small particles of
skin. A resourceful technician could probably lift DNA from a licked stamp or
abrasive doorknob, and a clever entrepreneur might very well devise an envelope
seal that efficiently captures serviceable cells from the tongue sealing the envelope
flap. The limits to the potential vehicles for castoff human cells that could
provide a serviceable DNA sample are endless-so too the potential for looking
into a stranger's DNA surreptitiously. No invasion of the body, of a private
space, or of a relationship need occur for genetic testing. For recently born
children, or hospital patients, blood may already be collected in stored tissue
samples or on Guthrie Cards."'
Considering how much data is available in various data banks or medical
specimens, how safe are the systems in which the data is stored? The literature
on privacy or medical confidentiality does not include any systematic analyses of
how often confidentiality provisions are breached. The rules protecting the
systems provide some assurances of confidentiality, wiih many exceptions, but
rarely do the rules provide a rigid privilege that would withstand challenges from
private citizens, law enforcement personnel and requests that arise in the midst
of litigation.
VI. Discrimination in Insurance
A. STATE LAW ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
In the absence of federal antidiscrimination law that would prohibit insur-
ance discrimination on grounds of genetic test or condition, the states remain
free to fashion their own laws to regulate the business of insurance. Fifteen states
provide some level of protection for information derived from genetic tests by
60. 42 USCA S 290dd-2 (West Supp 1996). For corresponding federal regulations, see
Confidentiality of Alcohol & Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 CFR 5§ 2.1 et seq (1995)
(corresponding federal regulations).
61. Jean E. McEwen and Phillip R. Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA "Banks," 55
Am J Human Genetics 196 (1994).
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prohibiting its use as a condition of insurance coverage. The following subsec-
tions catalogue the antidiscrimination provisions of state insurance law.62
1. Alabama
Alabama law prohibits denial of health or disability insurance coverage to
applicants diagnosed as having sickle-cell anemia, and forbids denial of medical
claims related to the disease,63 but does not characterize the disease as a congen-
ital or genetic ailment, and makes no distinction between carriers of the trait and
those who suffer from the disease itself.
2. California
California has one of the most extensive statutory schemes of all the states
that prohibit discrimination in insurance. It also controls the confidentiality of
genetic test information in private hands with civil and criminal penalties.
Until 1995, California provided civil and criminal penalties for negligent or
willful disclosure of genetic information by a whole host of specifically defined
and state regulated insurance companies and health concerns, including: health
care service plans, life or disability insurers, self-insured employee welfare benefit
plans, and nonprofit hospital service plans.64 They were prohibited from dissem-
62. As this Article was going to press, New Jersey enacted a new Genetic Privacy Act
that will regulate the use of genetic information as a condition of employment and for
some types of insurance coverage. 1996 NJ Sess Law Serv 126 (West 1996). Incorporating
protections against genetic discrimination into the general rubric of state civil rights law,
New Jersey specifically prohibits the use of genetic information in hiring or other job-
related decisions and also rules out reliance on genetic underwriting as a requirement for
access to medical coverage. Genetic information may, however, be used by life insurers as
long as it is "reasonably related to anticipated claim experience." Companies requiring
genetic testing for life insurance and underwriting must notify applicants of the testing
requirement and obtain written informed consent before proceeding. The subject of the test
may request that the life insurer provide a copy of test results to a designated physician.
The state Commissioner of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Commis-
sioner of Banking and Insurance, is charged with developing regulations that will outline
procedures for obtaining written informed consent.
Criminal penalties, including fines and up to one year of imprisonment, are
available-as are private civil damages-as remedies for wrongful disclosure of genetic
information.
Adoption of this law was delayed by New Jersey Governor Christine Todd
Whitman's veto of a similar bill that was unanimously passed by the New Jersey As-
sembly. The earlier bill was more expansive in its protection of genetic data, defining
tissue samples and information derived from DNA testing as the property of the individual
from whom the samples were obtained. Those provisions were eliminated from the revised
bill Whitman eventually signed into law. See generally New Jersey: Gov. Whitman
Conditionally Vetoes Genetic Privacy Protection Bill, 5 BNA Health L Rptr 40 d17 (Oct
10, 1996).
63. Ala Code S 27-5-13 (1986) ("[A]ny insurance company doing business within the
state which offers health or disability insurance, is hereby prohibited from denying
coverage to applicants because the applicant has been diagnosed as having sickle-cell
anemia, and is hereby required to pay any valid claim made involving treatment or care
of sickle-cell anemia in accordance with other policy provisions.").
64. Cal Civ Code S 56.17 (West Supp 1996) (Negligent disclosure of genetic test re-
[3:589
Genetic Confidentiality 603
inating genetic information that they might otherwise lawfully collect. Health
insurers were not allowed to discriminate on the basis of a person's genetic
characteristics or those of a child or other family member.
A 1995 law imposes an increased penalty for a violation of these provisions
by an insurer, and establishes additional remedies and administrative penalties.
Of particular interest is the definition of "Genetic characteristics" that appears
in several sections of California law:
"Genetic characteristics" means any scientifically or medically identifiable
gene or chromosome, or alteration thereof, which is known to be a cause
of a disease or disorder, or determined to be associated with a statistically
increased risk of development of a disease or disorder that is presently not
associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder.'5
This definition applies to companies selling health insurance," self insured
plans,67 and nonprofit hospital service plans."8 The list of potential conditions
falling into this category includes Tay-Sachs trait, sickle-cell trait, thalassemia
trait, and X-linked hemophilia A.
Companies selling life or disability insurance may not discriminate in terms
of enrollment, conditions or benefits "on the basis of a person's genetic charac-
teristics that may, under some circumstances, be associated with disability in that
person or that person's offspring."69 Genetic characteristics are defined for life
insurers as they are for health insurers,7 though applications may be declined,
rates increased, and coverage limited for people whose genetic diseases become
symptomatic, or, in other words, "on the basis of manifestations of any disease
or disorder."7
suilts contained in an applicant or enrollee's medical records by a health care service'plan
carries civil penalty in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars; willful disclosure
not less than one thousand dollars and no more than five thousand dollars; willful or
negligent disclosure of the results of a test for a genetic characteristic to a third party in
a manner that identifies or provides identifying characteristics of the person to whom the
test results apply, misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars,
and liable for all actual damages.). Similar provisions are contained in Cal Ins Code
S 10123.35 (West Supp 1996) (self-insured welfare benefit plan); Cal Ins Code S 10140.1
(West Supp 1996) (insurer licensed to issue life or disability insurance); Cal Ins Code
S 11512.965 (West Supp 1996) (nonprofit hospital service plan).
65. Cal Ins Code S 10147 (West Supp 1996). See also Cal Ins 510123.3(d)
(§10123.3(d) adds the following clause: "or inherited characteristic that may derive from
the individual or family member"). California's statutory scheme distinguishes between
"insurers" and "health care service plans" and often repeats statutory language in two
different parts of the code depending on the entity being regulated.
66. Cal Ins Code 5 10143 (West 1993).
67. Cal Ins Code S 10123.3 (West Supp 1996).
68. Cal Ins Code S 11512.95 (West Supp 1996).
69. Cal Ins Code S 10140 (West Supp 1996).
70. Cal Ins Code S 10147 (West Supp 1996).




Colorado defines genetic information as "the unique property of the individ-
ual to whom the information pertains" and declares a legislative intent of
preventing "information derived from genetic testing from being used to deny
access to health care insurance, group disability insurance, or long-term care
insurance coverage."72 Colorado also declares that the information is confiden-
tial and privileged, and requires written consent of the test subject before test
results can be released.7'
The suggestion of strong protections of confidentiality are illusory, however,
in light of numerous exceptions that are catalogued in the law: genetic testing
information can be released to law enforcement officials in a criminal investiga-
tion;7 4 to research facilities (without identification of the individual research
subject);7' to a court in a parentage proceeding;76 in civil litigation to deter-
mine the cause of a damage or injury;' in cases of sexual assault;7" or to the
state or local public health authorities." Confidentiality also does not apply to
the provision of life insurance or individual disability insurance. 0
Violation of the statute is declared an "unfair practice" and is subject to the
provisions of sections 10-3-1106 through 10-3-1113. Relief for civil actions can
include equitable relief, actual damages, costs and attorney fees.8'
4. Florida
Florida declares the results of DNA testing to be confidential and-except
for purposes of criminal prosecution, post-conviction banking, or determining
paternity-the "exclusive property of the person tested."82 Test results may not
be disclosed without consent, and violators of this requirement assume liability
for a misdemeanor. A person who performs DNA analysis or receives informa-
tion derived from DNA analysis must provide the person tested with notice that
the test was performed and the information was received. The notice must also
state whether the information was used in any decision to grant or deny any
insurance, employment, mortgage, loan, credit, or educational opportunity.83
72. 1995 Colo Rev Stat 5 10-3-1104.7(1) (1995).
73. 1995 Colo Rev Stat S 10-3-1104.7(3)(a) (1995).
74. 1995 Colo Rev Stat 5 10-3-1104.7(4) (1995).
75. 1995 Colo Rev Stat 5 10-3-1104.7(5) (1995).
76. 1995 Colo Rev Stat S 10-3-1104.7(6) (1995).
77. 1995 Colo Rev Stat 5 10-3-1104.7(7) (1995).
78. 1995 Colo Rev Stat S 10-3-1104.7(8) (1995).
79. 1995 Colo Rev Stat S 10-3-1104.7(9) (1995).
80. 1995 Colo Rev Stat 5 10-3-1104.7(10) (1995).
81. 1995 Colo Rev Stat S 10-3-1104.7(11) (1995).
82. Fla Stat Ann S 760.40(2)(a) (West 1994).




Georgia forbids any insurer, including most entities that provide prepaid
health care, along with "accident and sickness insurance companies,"84 frorti
using genetic information to deny coverage.'- It asserts that "[g]enetic informa-
tion is the unique property of the individual tested."8" It prescribes "prior
written consent" for testing, declares the results of testing "confidential and
privileged" and prohibits any insurer that receives information derived from
genetic testing from using the information for a "nontherapeutic" purpose, as
well as prohibiting insurers from seeking information derived from genetic
testing.
" 87
The privilege breaks down in the criminal context, where no consent is
required to release information on a defendant or suspect.8 A similar exception
allows disclosures for scientific research. 9 The nondiscrimination provision all
but disappears in light of exceptions listed in another part of the statute, which
allows use of genetic testing in the context of:
a life insurance policy, disability income policy, accidental death or dis-
memberment policy, Medicare supplement policy, long-term care insurance
policy, credit insurance policy, specified disease policy, hospital indemnity
policy, blanket accident and sickness policy, franchise policy issued on an
individual basis to members of an association, limited accident policy,
health insurance policy written as a part of workers' compensation equiva-
lent coverage, or other similar limited accident and sickness policy.9"
Violations of the law are declared an unfair trade practice, giving rise to statuto-
ry penalties, and a civil cause of action is created, with equitable relief, actual
damages and attorney's fees and costs listed among the remedies."
6. Louisiana
Discrimination in life or disability insurance on the basis of sickle-cell trait
is prohibited, but waiting periods, pre-existing conditions, or dreaded disease
rider exclusions are not ruled out "if they do not unfairly discriminate."92
84. Ga Code Ann S 33-54-2 (Michie Supp 1995) ("Definitions").
85. Ga Code Ann 5 33-54-1(4) (Michie Supp 1995).
86. Ga Code Ann S 33-54-1(1) (Michie Supp 1995).
87. Ga Code Ann S 33-54-3, S 33-54-4 (Michie Supp 1995) ("Prohibited use of
information").
88. Ga Code Ann 5 33-54-5 (Michie Supp 1995).
89. Ga Code Ann S 33-54-6 (Michie Supp 1995).
90. Ga Code Ann S 33-54-7 (Michie Supp 1995).
91. Ga Code Ann 5 33-54-8 (Michie Supp 1995).




Maryland formerly proscribed "unfair discrimination" in life, health and
annuity contracts for insurance, but apparently leaves the definition of "unfair"
up to the actuaries, allowing all differential ratemaking, underwriting, and so on,
that is accompanied by an "actuarial justification." ' Maryland's 1996 statutory
revisions remove anti-discriminatory provisions that applied to life, life annuity
or disability insurance policies, maintaining the prohibition on use of "genetic
tests" in health insurance policies only.94
8. Minnesota
Minnesota's "genetic discrimination act" defines a "genetic test" as "a
presymptomatic test of a person's genes, gene products, or chromosomes for the
purpose of determining the presence or absence of a gene or genes that exhibit
abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, including carrier status, that are known to
be the cause of a disease or disorder, or are determined to be associated with a
statistically increased risk of development of a disease or disorder.""5
The act prohibits insurers, in determining eligibility for insurance, setting
premiums, or limiting coverage, from requiring applicants to submit to genetic
tests, or considering whether a genetic test was taken by an applicant or their
relative, except when the insured voluntarily takes such tests following informed
consent. The written consent document must inform the applicant that she
should consider consulting with a genetic counselor prior to taking the test and
it must state whether the insurer will pay for the consultation. 6
Minnesota prohibits discrimination in health plans, but not in life insurance
coverage.9 7
9. New Hampshire
New Hampshire defines genetic testing "as a test, examination or analysis
which is generally accepted in the scientific and medical communities for the
purpose of identifying the presence, absence or alteration of any gene or chro-
mosome, and any report, interpretation or evaluation of such a test, examination
or analysis." 98 The law prohibits the use of genetic tests for health insurance,
but not for life, disability income, or long-term care insurance. The fact of
genetic testing or its results are protected from disclosure unless the subject of
93. Ann Code of Md S 223 Unfair discrimination-Life, health and annuity contracts.
94. Ann Code of Md 5223.1. See also Eric Wulfsberg, et al, Antitrypsin Deficien-
cy--Impact of Genetic Discovery on Medicine and Society, 271 J Am Med Assoc 217,
221 (1994) ("[A] major unresolved issue is what constitutes actuarial justification and how
it will be determined, given the rarity of most genetic diseases."). See generally Harry
Ostrer, et al, Insurance and Genetic Testing: Where are We Now?, 52 Am J Human
Genetics 565, 574 (1993).
95. Minn Stat Ann S 72A.139 (West 1996).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. NH Rev Stat Ann S 141-H:1 (IV) (Equity 1995).
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the test has given written, informed consent. Exceptions to this rule are allowed
to establish paternity, to test newborns for metabolic disorders and for purposes
of criminal investigations and prosecutions.
An unusual feature of the New Hampshire legislation appears to establish a
right to have access to testing. It provides that:
No person shall refuse to perform genetic testing, or to arrange for genetic
testing to be performed, or to do business with an individual, solely
because the individual to be tested refuses to consent to providing the test
results to some or all persons.99
This could be interpreted to preclude physicians or genetic counselors from
involving family members in genetic counseling sessions without the specific
consent of the tested person.
10. North Carolina
North Carolina law prohibits discrimination against persons who carry the
trait for sickle-cell or hemoglobin C in provision of policies or rates for medi-
cal,' °" dental, or hospital coverage,'' and life insurance."2
11. Ohio
Ohio defines "genetic screening or testing" as:
[A] laboratory test of a person's genes or chromosomes for abnormalities,
defects, or deficiencies, including carrier status, that are linked to physical
or mental disorders or that indicate a susceptibility to illness, disease, ot
other disorder.., which test is a direct test for abnormalities, defects or
deficiencies, and not an indirect manifestation of genetic disorders.' 3
It forecloses the use of genetic test results by HMOs,"'° sickness or accident
insurers,' °s or self-insurers,0 ' but allows them to consider such results if they
are submitted voluntarily and the results are favorable to an applicant.
12. Oregon
Oregon" 7 law prohibits some types of insurance discrimination, and
exhaustively lists when genetic information may be used, disclosed and demand-
ed. It also includes what may be the most extensive and elaborate state legislative
99. NH Rev Stat Ann S 141-H:2 (II) (Equity 1995).
100. NC Gen Stat S 58-51-45 (1994).
101. NC Gen Stat §58-65-70 (1994).
102. NC Gen Stat S 58-58-25 (1994).
103. Ohio Rev Code Ann S 1742.42 (Baldwin 1994).
104. Id.
105. Ohio Rev Code Ann S 3901.49 (Baldwin 1995).
106. Ohio Rev Code Ann S 3901.50 (Baldwin 1995).
107. Or Rev Stat S 659.705 (1995).
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statement on the uses and abuses of genetic testing.' It defines "genetic test"
as "a test for determining the presence or absence of genetic characteristics in an
individual, including tests of nucleic acids such as DNA, RNA and mitochondrial
DNA, chromosomes or proteins in order to diagnose a genetic characteris-
tic, ""' and requires informed consent for all testing and use of testing results
except for purposes of federal criminal law relating to the identification of
persons, for the purpose of establishing the identity of a person in the course of
an investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency, or a medical examiner;
for anonymous research where the identity of the subject will not be revealed; for
identification of deceased individuals; for newborn screening; and for establishing
paternity."0
Oregon's legislative policy makes an individual's genetic information that
person's property, requiring specific authority for retaining DNA samples and
mandating destruction of all others."' It creates a qualified privilege, allowing
anyone to refuse to disclose or be compelled, by subpoena or any other means,
to disclose the identity of an individual upon whom a genetic test has been
performed or to disclose genetic information about the individual in a manner
that permits identification of that person, except in specifically enumerated cases.
It also prohibits redisclosure of genetic information by those who hold it without
the consent of the owner."2
In contrast to Minnesota, Oregon forbids underwriting on the basis of good
test results as well as negative results. An insurance provider may not use genetic
108. Id. ((1) "The Legislative Assembly finds that: (a) The DNA molecule contains
information about an individual's probable medical future. This information is written in
a code that is rapidly being broken. (b) Genetic information is uniquely private and
personal information that should not be collected, retained or disclosed without the
individual's authorization. (c) The improper collection, retention or disclosure of genetic
information can lead to significant harm to the individual, including stigmatization and
discrimination in areas such as employment, education, health care and insurance. (d) An
analysis of an individual's DNA provides information not only about an individual, but
also about the individual's parents, siblings and children, thereby impacting family privacy,
including reproductive decisions. (e) Current legal protections for medical information,
tissue samples and DNA samples are inadequate to protect genetic privacy. (f) Laws for
the collection, storage and use of identifiable DNA samples and private genetic information
obtained from those samples are needed both to protect individual privacy and to permit
legitimate genetic research. (2) The purposes of sections 1 to 5 and 8 of this Act and the
provisions of ORS 659.036, 659.227 and 746.015 relating to genetic characteristics,
information and testing are as follows (a) To define the rights of individuals whose genetic
information is collected, retained or disclosed. (b) To define the circumstances under which
an individual may be subjected to genetic testing. (c) To define the circumstances under
which an individual's genetic information may be collected, retained or disclosed. (d) To
protect against discrimination by an insurer or employer based upon an individual's genetic
characteristics.").
109. See Or Rev Stat S 659.700 (1995).
110. See Or Rev Stat S 659.715 (1995).
111. Id.
112. See Or Rev Stat S 659.720 (1995).
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information to discriminate against existing or potential policyholders of any




Refusal to issue a life insurance policy may not be conditioned upon the
existence of sickle-cell trait or hemoglobin C trait in a potential insured."'
14. Virginia
Virginia's law establishes a two-year moratorium on the use of genetic
information by "accident and sickness" insurers for the purposes of denying,
restricting, canceling or otherwise limiting insurance coverage or availability."'
It also makes all information obtained from genetic screening or testing that was
conducted prior to the conclusion of the moratorium period confidential and
unavailable for underwriting purposes. 1"
15. Wisconsin
Wisconsin prohibits "unfair genetic tests" in employment" 7 and specifies
remedies of reinstatement and/or back pay."' It restricts the use of genetic tests
to determine health insurance coverage. Life insurance or income continuation
insurers may not set rates or condition any other aspect of coverage on factors
"not reasonably related to the risk involved."" 9
Written, informed consent is required before any employer or labor entity
can perform genetic tests, and no disclosures of test results may be made to
employers without the prior written and informed consent of the subject of the
test. Violations carry misdemeanor liability.120
B. WHAT Do STATE INSURANCE LAWS PROHIBT-A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
As the previous sections demonstrate, great variety exists among state
provisions protecting genetic information from discriminatory use in the insur-
ance context. The following hypothetical case is offered as a vehicle for exploring
how effectively, a particular state's antidiscriminatory law would affect a person
with a sensitive medical record and a very serious genetic disease.
113. Id.
114. Tenn Code Ann S 56-7-207 (1994).
115. Va Code S 38.2-508.4(B) (1996) (effective until 1998).
116. Va Code 5 38.2-613.1 (1996), Va SB 335 (amending § 38.2-613 and adding
S 38.2-508.4).
117. Wis Stat Ann §5 111.32, 111.372 (West Supp 1995).
118. Wis Stat Ann 5 111.39 (West Supp 1995).
119. Wis Stat Ann 5 631.89 (West Supp 1995).




Carl is 40 years old. He migrated from Argentina ten years ago to pursue
graduate education as a physicist. Several of Carl's relatives died in their mid-
40's from Huntington's disease. Their medical records are lost in Argentina, and
none of Carl's doctors in America have been told of his family background.
Upon graduation, Carl started Atomic Dumping Inc., ("ADI"), a nuclear
waste disposal company, which he recently sold for several million dollars. Part
of the sale involved an agreement by Carl to remain employed for five years as
chief executive officer of the company.
The new owners propose to offer health insurance, including a long and
short-term disability plan, to all full-time employees of ADI. A life insurance
benefit equal to twice an employee's annual salary will be available at no charge
and employees may purchase additional coverage at prevailing rates. Subsidized
liability insurance will also be an optional employee benefit.
Carl applies for health, disability, and personal liability coverage, and life
insurance with a death benefit equivalent to his net worth-2.5 million dollars.
He is informed that he will have to submit to a medical examination and DNA
analysis before the policies will be issued.
Assume that Carl is affected with Huntington's. He knows of his family
background but is unaware of his own condition. He decides to litigate the
question of conditioning insurance coverage on the results of a DNA analysis.
How might he fare under the various state laws now in force?
In California, Carl's genetic characteristics could not be used as the basis of
discriminatory treatment in life, health or disability insurance as long as he was
asymptomatic. The law would appear to protect individuals who have autosomal
dominant diseases such as Huntington's, even though they are virtually certain
to develop symptoms of that disease, and at high risk for premature disability
and death. California law seems to allow for cancellation or nonrenewal of
Carl's insurance coverage at the first hint of symptoms. It Is not clear whether
insurance companies could ask, absent testing, whether Carl had a family history
of Huntington's and use his truthful response to deny coverage, or whether
benefits that would pay for treatment of Carl's eventual symptoms could be
excluded from coverage.
In Florida, Carl would apparently only have the right to receive notice that
he didn't get insurance because of his DNA test-not a right to coverage.
Maryland law would not allow a health insurer to demand genetic testing,
but also would not prohibit questions about the health or cause of death of
Carl's family members. It would also not preclude a policy provision that ruled
out medical payments for Huntington's disease. Should Carl choose not to
answer, or answer dishonestly, his health insurance might not be forthcoming.
On the other hand, a life or disability insurer could demand a genetic test.
In New Hampshire, Carl could agree to be tested-but refuse to release the
results if they confirm his Huntington's disease. A similar result would seem to
apply in Minnesota. Carl would then be able to receive health insurance, but
would not be able to purchase the life, disability or liability insurance he desires.
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In Virginia, Carl would be protected in his search for health insurance for
two years, but would have no guarantee that coverage would be extended
beyond that period, or that any other type of insurance would be available.
Most of the other states would, in general, protect Carl's ability to purchase
a health insurance plan, while making life, disability, long-term care, accident,
liability or other types of coverage potentially subject to DNA testing.
Carl's options are not inviting. If he is not tested, he will not know whether
he has Huntington's. And that may be his decision regardless of insurance
questions. If he wants anything other than health insurance coverage, in most
states he must be tested and surrender the option of remaining ignorant of his
future health. If he tests positive he must live with the results: the knowledge of
the terrifying disease process and death he faces, and no access to many kinds of
insurance he wishes to purchase. Should he have the right (as California law
would seem to give him) to purchase extravagant amounts of life insurance even
if he knows there is a high likelihood of dying prematurely? Should he be
precluded from buying casualty or liability insurance, even though he remains
asymptomatic and would be no more at risk for accidents than any other
person?
Framing the question of insurance discrimination in the context of a man
with Huntington's disease highlights the conflicting policy objectives that are at
work in attempts to protect against insurance discrimination. It also shows the
arbitrary distinction between genetic data and other medical information. Even
though we claim differences for genetic data, suggesting that it often points to
conditions for which there is no treatment,' conditions such as Carl's would
be grounds for discrimination regardless of the source of information.
Existing practices of insurance discrimination against the "asymptomatic ill"
have been monitored by watchdog groups who assert that insurance companies
have used the results of gene-based tests to justify canceling coverage, saying that
a genetic abnormality is a preexisting condition; to deny coverage to unaffected
relatives of a person with a genetic disorder; and to refuse to issue a policy
unless an applicant submits to a genetic test." Such practices are warranted,
says the American Council on Life Insurance and the Health Insurance Associa-
tion of America (HIAA), to protect against "adverse selection."'" They assert
the right of insurers to know the results of any test an insurance applicant has
121. T. H. Cushing, Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?,
60 Defense Counsel J 249, 258-59 (1993) ("Those who oppose insurer's use of genetic
testing assert that genetic information is fundamentally different from other types of
medical information readily accessible to insurers. They argue that the immutable quality
of genetic information sets it apart from other sorts of medical information, such as a
person's blood pressure or cholesterol level.").
122. Paul R. Billings, Discrimination as a consequence of genetic testing, 50 Am J
Human Genetics 476, 478 (1992).




taken. 24 Critics of this position assert that the Human Genome Project could
become "a welfare program for insurance companies."" z
Confidentiality of test results-in those states where confidentiality is
protected--guarantees that health insurance will be available, at least to the
financially fortunate like Carl. Confidentiality of test results also underlines the
moral hazard that Carl will overpurchase life coverage precisely because he
knows how much he will need it. If he knows his genetic status, Carl can
purchase life insurance as if it were a secure and predictable financial instrument,
rather than buying into the lottery of risk that faces most people to whom life's
prospects are unknown.
Is health insurance coverage, and health insurance discrimination, different?
Perhaps so. While arguments in favor of a universal right to health care are
readily available, it is hard to construct a reasoned argument for a "right" to life
insurance. In both cases the real issue seems not to be confidentiality. Only for
serious or socially stigmatic diseases is confidentiality crucial. What is so intimate
about a one in 50 chance of being subject to hypertension, or a one in 200
chance of being a likely candidate for gallbladder surgery? The real issue is
discrimination in health insurance-the threat of being wiped out because of the
impact of major illness that may or may not be slightly more predictable because
of genetic markers. If we had a national program that guaranteed health cover-
age, confidentiality beyond what is expected now in the medical setting would
rarely be an issue.
Most of the arguments against discrimination in health insurance are not
confidentiality arguments, but health policy arguments about who should get
care and at what cost.
VII. The Rhetorical War
Supporters of the Model Genetic Privacy Act claim that genetic information
is uniquely private and personal. 126 They call it a "future diary" that "will tell
us more and more about a person's likely future, particularly in terms of
physical and mental well-being." They describe genetic testing as a process that
involves "locating predictors of undesirable and stigmatizing conditions-such as
cancers, and conditions that lead to mental illness and dementia."
What is the impact of this image of genetic data as a "future diary"? First,
it promises too much from the fruits of genetic research. It may be many years
before we are able to define the functional utility of the millions of bits of
genetic material that comprise our biological blueprint. We may, even at that
point, still not be able to predict how that material relates to the environment in
124. Id.
125. Myk Cherskov, Fighting Genetic Discrimination, 78 ABA J 38 (1992) (quoting
Theresa Morelli).
126. See, for example, George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks Protecting
Coded 'Future Diaries,' 19 J Am Med Assoc 2346 (1993). The authors of the Genetic
Privacy Act are George Annas, Leonard Glantz, and Patricia Roche.
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which it develops, or how often or why it changes form within a lifetime. It is
unlikely that the Human Genome Project or any successor initiative will answer
all the possible questions to adequately point us toward even a probabilistic
"future diary."
But what else does the phrase suggest? A diary is a self-generated, personal
reflection on the daily details of life. Many of these details are consciously
planned and contingent upon our life choices, our individual history, and our
career of social interaction, not our genetic makeup alone. Our diary may be a
chronicle of disease (A Diary of the Plague Year) or a parade of unconventional
behavior (The Diary of Samuel Peppys) or even a canticle of hope (The Diary of
Anne Frank). Though we may, like Carl, be at high risk for disease, our life's
significance should not be conceptualized as a mere product of our genes.
This metaphor of genes as "future diary" overemphasizes the language of
fear that runs through many proposals for heightened genetic confidentiality.
Phrases such as "the genetic underclass" and "asymptomatic ill" are dangerous
in themselves and characterizing a genetic condition as an "immutable, heritable
taint," "ineradicable marker of deviance," or "scarlet letter" tends to raise the
implicit assumption of genetic determinism to an accepted fact. The diaries of the
living are not yet complete and we shall all die eventually, with or without the
knowledge of how little, or how much, our genetic heritage marked the moment
of that death. The language of scientific reductionism need not be one more
contributor to the potential for genetic discrimination.
VIII. Conclusion
The driving force in the calls for anti-discrimination in the health insurance
market is not the problem of genetic discrimination, but the absence of afford-
able insurance for some 30 to 40 million Americans of unremarkable genetic
endowment. Attention focused on the need for genetic confidentiality can have
the unintended effect of creating an aura of stigma for a few noteworthy diseas-
es, rather than heightening general awareness that many if not most diseases
have some genetic component. Our recent experience with the HIV/AIDS
epidemic should alert us that "exceptionalism"-the attempt to create discrete
categories of law for particular groups of medical patients-can have the result
of further marginalizing the group we are attempting to protect. Exceptional
treatment for diseases for which we have only recently discovered a genetic
component and raising the level of rhetoric in order to advocate legal change is
likely also to raise the level of paranoia about those diseases rather than working
toward removing whatever stigma that already surrounds genetic disease.
Discrimination on genetic grounds is only one part of the much larger
problem of competitive risk-rating that puts many potential policyholders beyond
the ambit of insurance coverage. Until that problem is fixed, and there is a
system of accessible health care available to all who need it, the attempt to carve
out some portion of the public for unfavorable treatment because of medical
condition-genetic or not-will remain endemic. Rules for genetic confidentiality
will not cure the health care crisis. This is not an argument against the very real
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danger of genetic discrimination. It is a warning that precipitous legislation that
does not take into account existing law and its efficacy (or lack thereof) may fall
prey to the same shortcomings that have been demonstrated by earlier attempts
at protective legislation.
